The argument against reproductive cloning Charles Murtaugh graciously responded to my request for a rationale which supports therapeutic cloning while banning reproductive cloning. He referred me to this article as well as one he wrote. The thrust of both articles is that there is a moral repugnance to designing babies that should warn us away from this type of activity. In response to my e-mail, he writes the following:
I don't like the idea of "designing" children, or imposing our will upon their very genetic character.
Don't we already do that? When we select our mates, we select them based on qualities which will affect our offspring, intelligence, physical attractiveness, athleticism, emotional stability, etc. What we find attractive has developed over generations into a set of characteristics which enhance our ability, and more importantly, the ability of our offspring to survive.
"But that's an unconscious process, nothing like the deliberate selection of characteristics using genetic recombination."
Does that really make a difference? The pro-choice crowd has long advance the argument that abortions are OK because miscarriages occur spontaneously. Doesn't that indicate that duplicating the actions of nature through artificial means is acceptible?
"That's different. We aren't talking about abortion, we're talking about cloning!"
The logic is certainly the same, but we'll let it go for now.
You don't like artificially 'designing' a baby, unless it occurs through natural actions. Well then, what about artificial insemination? Women choose the sperm according to the characteristics of the donor, based on their wishes for their child. Isn't this artificial as well? As we learn more and more about the genome, it will be possible to chose not only eye color, but physical proportions, intelligence, musical or artistic abilities, possibly even temperment. No genetic manipulation needed, just a road map and a menu of choices.
This is already happening today, and with little or no outcry, unless folks disagree with the attributes which are selected for, as in the recent case of the two deaf lesbians creating a deaf child. So should this practice be banned? Should women who go to a sperm bank be required to face the luck of the draw?
Of course not. So now we can agree that 'designing a child' occurs already, whether through natural processes or artificial ones. The only difference here is the technique used to implement the design.
Let's remove the 'design' objection all together. No modifications, no selection of characteristics, just the duplication of an already existing pattern.
From Charles' article linked above:
A cloned child, made rather than begotten, is a pet: His or her "breed" picked out for its "unique characteristics" just as a border collie is chosen for its intelligence and a poodle because it doesn't shed much hair.
So, why this insistence that a cloned child would be somehow inferior to the original? Why look at it as less than human, as a pet?
Actually, this viewpoint is required in order to facilitate therapeutic cloning. If the cloned organism is somehow less than human, a thing instead of a person, then there is no problem with using its tissues for therapeutic purposes, regardless of the state of developement of the fetus. If, however, the child has the recognized potential to become a person, then using his tissues for therapeutic purposes becomes problematic, as we must then determine when this mass of cells becomes a person. Such a determination has proven to be elusive.
The same logic which supports therapeutic cloning also supports reproductive cloning. To support one and not the other reveals an inconsistency in the application of that logic.
But now let's turn to Mr. Kass, and see what he has to say. Charles tells us that he agrees with much of what Mr. Kass has to say
First, an important if formal objection: any attempt to clone a human being would constitute an unethical experiment upon the resulting child-to-be. As the animal experiments (frog and sheep) indicate, there are grave risks of mishaps and deformities. Moreover, because of what cloning means, one cannot presume a future cloned child's consent to be a clone, even a healthy one. Thus, ethically speaking, we cannot even get to know whether or not human cloning is feasible.
It is not at all clear to what extent a clone will truly be a moral agent. For, as we shall see, in the very fact of cloning, and of rearing him as a clone, his makers subvert the cloned child's independence, beginning with that aspect that comes from knowing that one was an unbidden surprise, a gift, to the world, rather than the designed result of someone's artful project. [Italics mine]
Here we see the implicit assumption that a clone is less than human, and that it would be raised differently than a baby produced in a more traditional fashion. This assumption is baseless. The children of in vitro fertilization are not raised differently than children of normal conception. Parents do not look on them as experiments, but as blessings. As for the last sentence, this is simple moral posturing. The use of birth control would also negate the 'unbidden surprise.' Should we ban contraceptives?
The cloned person may experience concerns about his distinctive identity not only because he will be in genotype and appearance identical to another human being, but, in this case, because he may also be twin to the person who is his "father" or "mother"--if one can still call them that.Do identical twins suffer from crises of identity? "Sometimes, she goes away, but I'm always right here." Somewhat simplified, bu it points out that identity rests in the ego, not in the genotype. If I were brought face to face with my doppelganger, I would not start to wonder if he was me. "I'm always right here."
Genetic distinctiveness not only symbolizes the uniqueness of each human life and the independence of its parents that each human child rightfully attains. It can also be an important support for living a worthy and dignified life.This assertion requires some back-up. Unfortunately, Kass doesn't supply any.
As bioethicist James Nelson has pointed out, a female child cloned from her "mother" might develop a desire for a relationship to her "father," and might understandably seek out the father of her "mother," who is after all also her biological twin sister. Would "grandpa," who thought his paternal duties concluded, be pleased to discover that the clonant looked to him for paternal attention and support?Wouldn't it be more likely that the child would form an attachment to any male providing a father figure, and not preferentially her grand father? While she may be genetically his daughter, by birth and experience, the two real keys, she is his grandaughter, and that is how she will react.
In the case of self-cloning, the "offspring" is, in addition, one's twin; and so the dreaded result of incest--to be parent to one's sibling--is here brought about deliberately, albeit without any act of coitus. Moreover, all other relationships will be confounded. What will father, grandfather, aunt, cousin, sister mean? Who will bear what ties and what burdens? What sort of social identity will someone have with one whole side--" father's" or "mother's"--necessarily excluded?The first sentence is emotional tripe. There is no incest involved. The rest is a litany of resistance to change. Why should the patern of relationships be confounded? We relate to others based on our experiences with them, not based on our genetic linkages. Why should one side of the family be excluded? Kass is taking the point of view that since a clone has genetic material from one parent only, the other parent has no involvement with the child. Adoptees and blended families refute that point of view.
Human cloning would also represent a giant step toward turning begetting into making, procreation into manufacture (literally, something "handmade"), a process already begun with in vitro fertilization and genetic testing of embryos. With cloning, not only is the process in hand, but the total genetic blueprint of the cloned individual is selected and determined by the human artisans.Here we have something of a legitimate concern, but it is interesting how early in his argument, Kass was concerned that the identity of a cloned child would be confused, as he shared a genotype with another person. Now he is saying that if the genotype is altered by artificial means, the product is designed, rather than natural, and inherently less than human. I dealt with this objection above.
Kass goes on to argue the 'slippery slope', that once cloning is legalized, then eugenics becomes a foregone conclusion. And it is on this point that I agree with him. I share his fears of a homogenized corporate population. The problem is that the first step on this slope is not just reproductive cloning, but therapeutic cloning. The commodification of human life begins a soon as you start creating and harvesting fetuses for tissues.
Unfortunately, this is all moot, as I can't think of a single example of a technology which, once discovered, has not been put to use, certainly not one as hotly desired as this one. WE will have cloning of both sorts, as well as genetic blueprinting and design, and it will be sooner rather than later.
Posted by Rich at April 24, 2002 3:44 AM